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Flood riskPolicy plays a very important role in natural resource management as it lays out a government framework for
guiding long-term decisions, and evolves in light of the interactions between human and environment. This
paper focuses on soil andwater conservation (SWC) policy in the Yellow River Basin (YRB), China. The problems,
rural poverty, severe soil erosion, great sediment loads and highﬂood risks, are analyzed over the period of 1949–
present using the Driving force–Pressure–State–Impact–Response (DPSIR) framework as a way to organize
analysis of the evolution of SWC policy. Three stages are identiﬁed in which SWC policy interacts differently
with institutional, ﬁnancial and technology support. In Stage 1 (1949–1979), SWC policy focused on rural devel-
opment in eroded areas and on reducing sediment loads. Local farmersweremainly responsible for SWC. The aim
of Stage 2 (1980–1990)was the overall development of rural industry and SWC. Amore integratedmanagement
perspective was implemented taking a small watershed as a geographic interactional unit. This approach greatly
improved the efﬁciency of SWC activities. In Stage 3 (1991 till now), SWC has been treated as the mainmeasure
for natural resource conservation, environmental protection, disaster mitigation and agriculture development.
Prevention of new degradation became a priority. The government began to be responsible for SWC, using ad-
ministrative, legal and ﬁnancial approaches and various technologies that made large-scale SWC engineering
possible. Over the historical period considered, with the implementation of the various SWC policies, the rural
economic and ecological system improved continuously while the sediment load and ﬂood risk decreasedonservation, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, Shaanxi, China.
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167F. Wang et al. / Science of the Total Environment 508 (2015) 166–177dramatically. The ﬁndings assist in providing a historical perspective that could inform more rational, scientiﬁc
and effective natural resource management going forward.
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Soil erosion has important impacts, both on-site and off-site (Vignola
et al., 2010; Wossink and Swinton, 2007), including the reduction of soil
depth, impairing the land's productivity, and the transport of sediments,
leading to deposition that degrades streams, lakes, and estuaries (Uri,
2001). In China's Loess Plateau, extensive soil erosion and water loss
have historically induced soil degradation and soil water shortages,
lowering crop yields, and exacerbating rural poverty, arable land and bio-
diversity loss on-site (Meng, 1997). It has also induced sedimentation in
the Yellow River (which has the greatest sediment load in theworld), re-
ducing reservoir capacity, causing the riverbed to rise, increasing the risk
ofﬂooddisasters, increasing themaintenance costs of the river banks, and
requiring more water to ﬂush the sediment to the sea (Zhao, 1996; Wu
et al., 2005; Mu et al., 2004).
Management of soil erosion in the China's Loess Plateau has relied
largely on the development and implementation of policies, which, over
time have greatly decreased the sediment load of the Yellow River.
Indeed, the mean annual suspended sediment load at Huayuankou
declined from 1.36 billion tons in 1956–1970 to 0.23 billion tons in
1996–2010 (15 years) (Meng, 1997; Tang, 2004). This paper un-
packs how policy approaches have changed over time to achieve
this improvement.
Science and policy are both relevant to land management (Freyfogle
and Newton, 2002; Stringer and Dougill, 2013). Although policy plays
an increasingly important role in environment and resource manage-
ment, and is considered fundamental to biodiversity conservation and
watershed management (Jansen et al., 2006; Miller et al., 2009), the suc-
cess of policy initiatives is contingent on effective stakeholder engage-
ment or public involvement (Cocklin et al., 2007; Stern and Mortimer,
2009). Policies can include land rent change, voluntary or ‘soft’ policy
based mainly on education, legal regulation, and national and local
laws and actions (Bennett and Vitale, 2001; Kelly, 2006; Hanna
et al., 2007; Gotmark et al., 2009; Stern and Mortimer, 2009;
Angelsen, 2010). Policy in this article is deﬁned as “a set of decisions
which are oriented towards a long-term purpose or to a particular
problem. Such decisions by governments are often embodied in leg-
islation and usually apply to a country as a whole rather than to one
part of it” (Sandford, 1985, p. 4).
Research in the Yellow River Basin (YRB) to date has focusedmostly
on SWC practices on the catchment slopes and how to dam the main
stream to reduce sedimentation on the riverbed of the lower reach
(YRCC ECR, 1991; Meng, 1997; Tang, 2004). Research on the role of
SWC policies is sorely lacking. While some analyses on SWC policy
changes exist at a regional scale in China (Ding, 1989; Guo, 1995),
they just describe the policy and pay very little attention to the impacts.
In focusing on the co-evolution of SWC policy and human–environment
linkages in the YRB in this paper, we argue that it allows an opportunity
for policy learning and to see what kinds of interventions have the
desired environmental impacts. These lessons can then be applied in fu-
ture policy developing, helping to guide it to better address some of the
key drivers, pressures and impacts of soil erosion.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the SWC policy changes in the
YRB since the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949.
This period ﬁts well with document availability. The next section sets
out our study area and methods used. After that, we use the Driving
force–Pressure–State–Impact–Response (DPSIR) framework as an orga-
nizational tool in order to explore on the whole picture of the SWCchallenge and the ways in which the policies affected the drivers, pres-
sures and states of the environment.
2. Research design and methodology
2.1. Study area
The Yellow River is the second largest river in China (Fig. 1) with a
drainage area of 752,000 km2 and a length of 5464 km. It originates
from the Qinghai–Tibet Plateau, ﬂows through the Loess Plateau and
the North China Plain (elevation below 100 m), and empties into the
Bohai Sea. The basin covers 9 provinces or autonomous regions, was
home to 110 million people in 2000, and accounted for around 9% of
China's total population (Giordano et al., 2004). The YRB covers a wide
range of vegetation types and climatic zones because of this large area
and elevation gradient. Mean annual precipitation in the basin is ap-
proximately 479 mm, but the regional and seasonal distribution is
very uneven due to the great inﬂuence of the monsoon season. About
60% of precipitation falls in the rainy season from June to September
(Zhao, 1996). The loess in the middle reaches of YRB is very prone to
erosion, causing the sediment load and concentration of the Yellow
River to be very large (Zhao, 1996; Walling and Webb, 1996). The
mean annual sediment load was 1.6 billion tons and the average sedi-
ment concentration 37.8 kgm−3 based onmeasured data at Sanmenxia
Hydrologic Station from 1919 to 1986 (Zhao, 1996). Over time, sedi-
ment deposition in the downstream river channel has caused the river-
bed to be up to 10 m higher than the surrounding land surface in some
places, a condition known as a “suspended river” or “perched river”
(Wu et al., 2005). Over thousands of years of Chinese history, frequent
catastrophic ﬂoods in the YRB have resulted in tremendous losses of
life and property (Hu et al., 1998).
2.2. Method and data
2.2.1. Framework of analysis
DPSIR framework (OECD, 1993; Gabrielsen and Bosch, 2003; Gobin
et al., 2004; Borja et al., 2006; Martins et al., 2012) provides the con-
ceptual framework for better understanding the complex relationship
between soil erosion and policy responses (see Fig. 2 for a brief over-
view). In the context of its application in the present study, it allows
us to explore the effects of responses on drivers, pressures, states and
impacts. Driving forces for SWC in the YRB include both natural and
socio-economic factors that disrupt the environment's ability to provide
provisioning ecosystem services, including e.g. food, fuel and forage
(Fig. 2). Shortages of these services drive environmental pressures
such as cultivation on slopes, deforestation and over-grazing. This
leads to soil erosion that has both on- and off-site effects. Society never-
theless responds with various policy measures such as regulation and
information provision, and in some cases, negative strategies that
could worsen the pressures. Feedbacks between responses mean that
the ways in which the problem of soil erosion is handled could affect
driving forces (R1), pressures (R2) and/or states (R3). Responses to
states (R3) might thereby have limited effect as they merely addresses
symptoms of land degradation, whereas positive responses to the driv-
ing forces (R1) could improve the regional economic and food condition
over the long-run as a solution to soil erosion control. These kinds of re-
lationships form the focus of our analysis.
Fig. 1. Location and sketch map of YRB (upper left: YRB in China; upper right: elevation of YRB; below: main cities, towns, branches and hydrologic stations of YRB).
Fig. 2.DPSIR framework for soil and water conservation in YRB (main DPSIR framework with description of each factors; R1, R2 and R3mean the 3 responses to Driving forces, Pressures,
and States. In this article, we mainly discussed the policy aspects of responses).
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sion (Cenacchi et al., 2011), human inﬂuence has been (and still is)
the most important factor in driving soil erosion (Zhao, 1996; Wang
et al., 2007). The human population in YRB demands food and fuel for
survival. Poverty and poor transportation determinewhether local peo-
ple can get the necessities for life from other regions.
In this study, we select food shortages as the main driving force (Li,
1996; Zhao, 1996) and regional ﬂoods as the main impacts that we an-
alyze (Luo and Le, 1996; Zhao, 1996). We ﬁrst identiﬁed and analyzed
historical documents on SWC policies, and used these to elucidate the
state, impact and driving forces to describe the problems, demands
and the suggested or encouraged solutions that could inﬂuence the
problems by addressing driving forces, pressures and/or states. Sub-
sequently, the implementation and effects of speciﬁc SWC measures
were identiﬁed, considering especially the policy objectives, tasks and
principles, and the institutional set-up (and responsibilities). The main
practices (measures and actions) at each stage were compared to
allow detailed analysis of the evolution of SWC policy.2.2.2. Data and analysis
Documents relating to SWC policy in the Yellow River were sourced
from national administrative departments including the Government
Administration Council (GAC, from October 21, 1949 to September 27,
1954, the then highest administrative department equivalent to the
State Council), National People's Congress (NPC), the State Council
(SC), Ministry of Water Resources (MWR), Ministry of Agriculture
(MOA), managing department of basins including Yellow River Water
Resources Commission (YRCC) and research institutes including
the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The types of document in-
cluded directives, decisions, reports, regulations and laws. Accord-
ing to the importance of their functions in conducting SWC actions
at the basin scale, 20 important formal documents were selected
for analysis (Table 1).
A 60-year annual dataset from1949 to 2010 of total population, area
of grain crops, grain yield, average yield and average grain per person of
4 main provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Shanxi Province and Ningxia Au-
tonomous Region (which cover most of the basin) (NBS NEGSD, 2010)
was analyzed to detect the driving forces of food production and supply.Table 1
Selected policy documents on SWC from 1949 to 2011 in YRB.a
Code Issued by Issued date Policy
P1 GAC Dec 19, 1952 Directive to arouse the m
and water conservation
P2 YRCC Feb 15, 1953 The decision of the harne
P3 MWR Dec 31, 1953 Summary of the water co
P4 MWR, CAS, et al. May to Dec, 1953 Working Report of Soil a
P5 NPC Standing Committee Jul 30, 1955 The decision of integrate
conservancy of the Yellow
P6 SC Jul. 24, 1957 The Provisional Outline o
P7 YRCC Aug 2, 1958 The soil and water conse
P8 SWCC of SC Apr 13, 1962 Report on the strengthen
P9 SC Apr 18, 1963 Decision on the Soil and
P10 MWR Apr 29, 1980 Act of Soil and Water Con
P11 SC Jun 3, 1982 The Regulations on the W
P12 NWLCG of SC Sep, 1983 The Provisional Rule to S
P13 CPC CC and SC Jan 1, 1985 The Ten Policies on Furth
P14 NPC Standing Committee Jun 29, 1991 (issued) and
Dec 25, 2010 (revised)
Law of The People's Repu
P15 SC Aug 1, 1993 Implementation of the La
P16 SC Jan 7, 1999 National Plan for Eco-env
P17 SC Dec 21, 2000 National Program for Eco
P18 SC Jan 20, 2003 Regulations on Conversio
P19 SC Aug 9, 2007 Circular of Policy on Conv
P20 CPC CC and SC Dec 31, 2011 Decision on accelerating
Abbreviation: CPC CC: Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party; NWLCG: National
State Council founded in 1982 and canceled in 1988, and a National Water Resources and Soil
a Pn in this paper means the relative document in this table.Data of cropland gradients of the 4 provinces in 1986 (CAS SSTlp, 1990a)
were used to show the state of land use and cover in relation to soil ero-
sion. The gradient of croplands distinguished 6 categories of land: ﬂat
lands— including level terraces, alluvial lands along the rivers like plains
and check-dam land (lands built up behind check-dams and ﬂat enough
for agriculture, normally the gradient is gentler than 1°), and sloping
croplands with gradient b3°, 3°–7°, 7°–15°, 15°–25° and N25°
respectively.
To analyze the impacts of soil erosion and water loss, ﬂood data was
included based on available historical records from 1841 to 1990 (Luo
and Le, 1996). The rush of runoff and sedimentation in the lower
reach induced by soil and water losses were the main causes of ﬂoods
in this region. Flood levels were classed according to the frequency of
ﬂood disaster possibility, and great ﬂood disaster, big ﬂood disaster
and normal ﬂood disaster were rarer than 5%, 5%–10% and 10%–20%
probabilities respectively.
Annual data on runoff and suspended sediment load in 1956–
2010 at Huayuankou Hydrological Station (Fig. 1) were abstracted
from the China River Sediment Bulletin (published by MWR) from
2000 (with datasets before 2000 as appendix) to 2010 to describe the
river characteristics. The watershed of the station is 730,036 km2,
accounting for 97.1% of the whole basin.
2.2.3. Three distinct stages in SWC policy
Wedivided our analysis of SWC policy into three stages according to
two important events: the publication of the Act of Soil and Water
Conservation at the small watershed scale (P10) and Law of The
People's Republic of China on Water and Soil Conservation (P14). This
provides a novel approach, different from that taken in other research
(Ding, 1989; CAS SSTlp, 1991b; YRCC UMB, 1993; Guo, 1995; CCoG,
1999). The stages thus distinguished are as follows:
Stage 1 (from1949 to 1979): Historical ﬂooddisasters and the desire
for hydropower and irrigation made the government and basin
manager plan to change the Yellow River from a harmful river into
a beneﬁcial river.
Stage 2 (from 1980 to 1990): Integrated control, taking a small wa-
tershed as a whole unit was introduced (P10), reﬂecting a need toasses for drought control and drought resistance and popularization of soil
ss the Yellow River in 1953
nservancy in the last four years and the policy and task in future
nd Water Conservation in Northwest China of Investigation Mission (draft)
planning for radical solution of disasters and exploration of water
River
f Soil and Water Conservation of the People's Republic of China
rvation planning in the middle reaches of the Yellow River from 1958 to 1962 (draft)
ing the soil and water conservation
Water Conservation in the Middle Reaches of the Yellow River
servation at the small watershed scale
ork of Water and Soil Conservation
trengthen the Soil and Water Conservation in Key Areas of water and soil loss
er Animating the Rural Economic
blic of China on Water and Soil Conservation
w of the People's Republic of Soil and Water Conservation
ironmental Improvement
-environmental Protection
n of Farmland to Forest
ersion of Farmland to Forest
water conservancy reform and development
Water and Land Conservation Work Coordination Group of State Council, a branch of the
Conservation Leading Group in 1988; SFA: State Forestry Administration.
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principle of watersheds based on previous experiences including
soil erosion control practices on the slopes, and sediment retention
and ﬂash ﬂood control with dams in the gullies.
Stage 3 (from 1991 till now): Since the issue of SWC law in 1991
(P14), the aims and tasks of SWC policy became broader and
more central. Prevention of new lands being destroyed began
to be the priority, after which technology and other approaches
were considered.
3. The evolving backdrop of policy through a DPSIR framework
Policies mainly embody the positive responses of humans to other
elements in theDPSIR framework. In this section, the continuous chang-
es of driving forces, pressures, states and impacts are described to
sketch the complex interconnections between conditions and process-
es. Special attention is given to dynamics over the three policy stages
distinguished because such factors changed continuously and the inter-
actions between elements varied in intensity.3.1. Driving force evolution
In Stage 1, because of the great effect of long-term conﬂicts including
the World War II and the Chinese Inner Wars, living conditions in the
YRB and whole of China were very poor before 1949. There were
36.86 million people in the 4 provinces in 1949, the average yield of
grain was very low (0.8 ton ha−1 in 1949) and the average food avail-
ability expressed as grain per person was 224.8 kg (Fig. 3). This meant
local people had to cultivatemore andmore land for food because tradi-
tional agricultural productivity was very low. The area of grain crops
increased from 10.94 million ha in 1949 to 12.97 million ha in 1966
(the largest in the whole research period), a change of up to 18.5%.
However, the population increased even faster in this period, to 57.33
million people (a 55.5% increase) by 1966 and 75.12 million people by
1979 (Fig. 3).
In Stage 2, the population continued to increase to 89.35 million peo-
ple in 1990 (Fig. 3). Average yields increased from just 2.0 t ha−1 in 1980
to about 2.6 t ha−1 in 1990. However, the total area of grain crops in the
YRB decreased to 11.02 million ha during this period, which combined
with the increase in population, means that food production has seen
no great improvement (ﬂuctuating around 300 kg person−1 sinceFig. 3. Population, area of grain crops and grain yield of the 4 provinces in 1949–2010 (the1979). Nevertheless it has proven to be enough to increase food security
in this region, as infrastructure development and an increase in incomes
have enabled people to purchase some various food and meat produced
in other regions, but the foodwas not enough for local people and animal
husbandry (CAS SSTlp, 1991b).
In Stage 3, the population increase continued and in 2010 was up to
105.02 million people (about 2.85 times the population in 1949)
(Fig. 3). However, the rate of population change has started to slow
down since 1990. The area under grain crops continued to decrease
after 1991, and although average yields continued to rise, total grain
production started to stabilize. Another important driving force has
been the economic development in China since 1988 (Supplementary
material 1, Fig. S1). In the four provinces, the gross regional product
(GRP) of primary industry (including crops, forests, animal husbandry,
sidelines and inner water ﬁshery) increased fast, but nevertheless the
share of direct output of agriculture reduced. The local people could
earnmoremoney from other industries and purchasemore and enough
food from other regions, leading to relieve of human pressure on the
land.3.2. Pressure evolution
In Stage 1, pressures were mainly exerted by the expansion of crop-
land on slopes because of population increases and food shortage, defor-
estation due to new cultivation and rural fuel, and over-grazing asmore
livestock were added in the hope of gainingmoremeat andmoney. An-
imal husbandry was a traditional livelihood activity in the Loess Plateau
because therewere plenty of areas supporting grasses thatwere not fea-
sible for cultivation both because of steep slopes and poor soil proper-
ties (CAS SSTlp, 1991a).
The share of cropland in the Loess Plateau was more than 30.0% in
1986 (CAS SSTlp, 1990a), but most cropland was on sloping land. In
the 4 selected provinces in 1986 (Fig. 4), the share of ﬂat lands and
sloping croplands with gradient b3°, 3°–7°, 7°–15°, 15°–25° and N25°
was 18.06%, 36.17%, 9.22%, 16.47%, 14.80% and 5.28%, respectively.
Croplands steeper than 7° accounted for 36.55% of cultivated lands
and 11.68% of the whole area, respectively. Indeed, this condition was
the result of long-term implementation of SWC practices on the slopes
before 1986 (P1, P2, P7 and P9), and evidence of the degree of human
pressure on the land in preceding decades.
Despite a gradual decline in the cultivated area after 1966, the avail-
ability of grasses has never been sufﬁcient because of the over-grazing4 provinces include Shaanxi, Shanxi, Gansu Province and Ningxia autonomous region).
Fig. 4. Gradient of cropland of the 4 provinces in YRB in 1996.
Table 2
Flood disasters in the Yellow River Basin from 1841 to 1990.
Period Level Total number Frequency
Great Big Normal Events per decade
1841–1870 5 2 3 10 3.3
1871–1900 8 9 0 17 5.7
1901–1930 4 2 1 7 2.3
1931–1960 6 1 4 11 3.7
1961–1990 2 1 1 4 1.3
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grassland in 1998 in Yan'an City (Shaanxi Bureau of Statistics, 1999).
The domestic animals could pull out the roots of grasses and some
small shrubs, and even eat the bark of shrubs and trees. This causes de-
struction of the natural vegetation more widely, leaving the soil loose
and exposed (Zhao, 1996).
In Stage 2 and Stage 3, the pressure on land reduced because of SWC
practices driven by policies. For example, 225.6 thousand km2 of de-
graded land was controlled from 1949 to 2009, but more than 80% of
these works were realized since 1970 (Sun et al., 2009). The SWC prac-
tices could last for several years to many decades and induced less soil
erosion and sediment load in the river. There were 8.27 million ha of
sloping cropland converted from 1999 to 2006 in YRB involving 8 mil-
lion households and 30 million people, with investment from central
government amounting to 5.1 billion US$ (38.8 billion Yuan RMB) (Gu
and Gu, 2007).
3.3. State and impact evolution
The continuing driving forces and pressures induced changes in land
use and the land degradation state (Fig. 2). Cultivated land is the main
source of sediment of the Yellow River, contributing more than 50% of
the sediment load (Tang, 2004; Lü et al., 2012). With cultivation of
steeper slopes, the soil erosion rate increased dramatically; on newly
cultivated lands steeper than 25° and 35°, the annual soil erosion rate
was around 15 thousand tons km−2 and 30 thousand tons km−2 re-
spectively (Tang, 2004) because of the natural intensive storms and
very little vegetation cover (CAS SSTlp, 1990b).
The state and impact relating to SWC are separate elements in the
DPSIR framework but they are closely interlinked. The state of land deg-
radation refers to soil erosion,water loss, nutrient loss, land surface bro-
ken (Fig. 2), while the impacts of such state include 2 different types.
The on-site impact includes soil loss, drought, nutrient depletion,
lower productivity, ecosystem degradation, etc., and the off-site impact
includes sedimentation in dams and riverbeds, water level rising, in-
creased ﬂood risk, disasters, costs for banks construction, etc. The sedi-
ment load and ﬂoods of the Yellow River were selected as impacts to
reﬂect the soil and water losses.
3.3.1. Flood disasters
Flood disasters have throughout history constituted themain impact
of the degraded state of land in the YRB. Floods broke out every year
from 1841 to 1949 (before Stage 1) affecting on average 149 counties
annually in China; there were 288 ﬂood disasters during that period,of which 42 events were in YRB (Luo and Le, 1996). Flood disasters in
YRB occurred very frequently (2.3–5.7 events per decade in 1871–
1960). Most of them were big or great disasters (Table 2). Flood disas-
ters affected all areas from the upper to the lower reaches but most
ﬂood disasters were in the densely populated and intensively used
lower reaches. Damages resulting from ﬂood disasters have been terri-
ble in the history of the YRB. For example, the great ﬂood disasters in
1933 and 1935 affected 67 counties and 27 counties, resulting in 3.64
million and 3.41 million victims, and more than 18 thousand and
3065 people died, respectively (Luo and Le, 1996).
Even though the ﬂood disasters were to a great extent induced by
weather conditions, the raising of the riverbed due to sediment deposi-
tion in the lower reach has aggravated ﬂood risk (Zhao, 1996). Further-
more, the river banks in the lower reach have seen a great inﬂux of
people, dramatically worsening potential damages of ﬂood disasters
and reminding us all the time of the risk of catastrophes even if there
were very few ﬂood disasters in Stages 2 and 3.
3.3.2. Sediment load change in each stage
In Stage 1, themean sediment loadbetween 1956 and 1979was1.29
billion tons at Huayuankou Station, although peaks of more than 2
billion tons occurred in 1958, 1959 and 1967 (Fig. 5). The total sediment
load in this stage amounted to 2.99 billion tons. At the beginning of
Stage 1 (1950–1959), the sediment load of the Yellow River was very
high (1.78 billion tons on average) (YRCC UMB, 1993), and sediment
deposition in the river bed of the lower reach amounted to 473
million tons annually (Xu, 2004), raising the river bed and increasing
ﬂood risk.
In Stages 2 and 3, themean sediment load reduced to 764million tons
and 366 million tons respectively, reﬂecting a 40.7% and 71.6% reduction
compared to Stage 1. The sediment loadwas less than 100million tons in
2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, meaning that soil erosion and sediment load
were controlled very effectively and also implying that the human
response should now change focus (Fig. 2).
4. Understanding policy evolution in each stage through a
DPSIR framework
4.1. Policy responses in Stage 1
BeforeWanmentioned SWC in 1936, people did not link ﬂood disas-
ters to soil erosion of the upper streams. They considered ﬂooding a nat-
ural process, and the long-term strategy to prevent ﬂood disasters
focused on ﬂushing the sediment into the sea and re-constructing the
river banks (YRCC ECR, 1991). Even until 1955, people believed “it
was proved that the ﬂooding and sediment were endless in the Yellow
River and the sediment should be ﬂushed away” (P5). But the new un-
derstanding of SWC promoted a more integrated policy, controlling
food supply, ﬂood prevention and environmental protection (Table 1).
4.1.1. Main aims and tasks
In the beginning of newChina, SWCwas listed as an independent ac-
tion of agricultural development (Ding, 1989). Since 1952, it wasmainly
implemented to combat drought (P1), as a complementary strategy to
improve grain production with more irrigation (P5). It was also
Fig. 5. Annual runoff and sediment load change at Huayuankou Hydrologic Station (YR) in 1956–2010.
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a beneﬁcial river” because it allowed the rational use of water for irriga-
tion and hydropower exploration (P3). Some responses were more
compulsory and included legal elements. For example, as a response
to pressures (R2, Fig. 2), cultivation of new cropland on steep slopes
was forbidden on land steeper than 25° (P1).
It was soon realized that to obtain synergies between R3 and R2 re-
sponses required the integrated control and treatment of the natural
watershed as a whole. The geographical focus changed from some
branches with very severe erosion problems (P1) to the regional scale,
covering an area from Hekou Town (Inner Mongolia) to Longmen
Town (Shannxi Province) (about 100 thousand km2) (P4, P8).
SWC also started paying attention to driving forces (R1) through
local economic development and integrated river management in
1955 (P5, P6, P7), considering management or control both for reduc-
tion of ﬂooding and improvement of hydropower. The SWC of the
Loess Plateauwas thus highlighted in national planning. The policy stat-
ed: “For the objectives of development of mountain region, improve-
ment of living standards, radical solution of disasters and exploration
of water conservancy of the Yellow River, we should try to conserve
water and soil, improve food production, promote the development of
each of the industries of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry,
and do our utmost to use the water and soil resources (P5)”.
4.1.2. Institutional aspects
The economic condition was poor and the managing ability of local
and central governments was weak in the beginning of new China.
The main stakeholders responsible for SWC were the local farmers in
1952 (P1). Since 1961, the CSWC SC pointed out that “to conserve soil
andwater based on production teams, themajor power of it is local peo-
ple and secondary is assistance from the state”. SWCC andYRCC ofMWR
stated the same main institutional set-up, i.e. local people with assis-
tance from the government (P8, P9).
4.1.3. Strategic options
In Stage 1, a policy on “overall survey, test and demonstration, pro-
gressive and careful extension” was put forward in 1953 (P4). It was a
rational policy and implied SWC should have scientiﬁc and cautious
strategies and that they needed more research and testing. Then, 1st
SWC Meeting of YRCC of MWR and SWCC of SC launched a policy of
“comprehensive planning, overall development, control the slopes andgullies together and concentrated control” in 1956 and 1957 respective-
ly (P5, P6). It not only covered the fundamental principles of planning,
measurement and development, but targeted what was considered
more important to control at the time: the slopes and gullies in areas
with poor economic and social conditions and ﬂooding risks. There
were many integrated multidisciplinary investigations to identify the
soil erosion types, intensity and distribution, rural economic condition,
SWC practices and planning, regional development and so on, to sup-
port policy implementation. For example, the investigation organized
by MWR and YRCC with 500 experts from CAS, MOA, MOF and their
branch institutes (P4); the integrated investigation organized by CAS
for SWC in the middle reaches of the Yellow River from 1955 to 1958
on a pilot area of 350 km2.
Before the climax of SWC was implemented by the local people, the
3rdNational SWCMeeting developed the policy to “pay the same atten-
tion to prevention and control, conserve the results of control, develop
the area and quality together for the ﬁnal control and stable and high
yield of crops” in 1958 according to the aims of agriculture development
at that time (P8).
Construction of reservoirs and dams for siltation was put forward as
fast and decisive practice as a response to states (R3, Fig. 2) in the begin-
ning (P1, P2, P3, P5), but later SWCpractices on the slopes becamemore
important than practices further downstream (P1, P2, P7 and P9).
Documents pointed speciﬁcally to “SWC on the sloping croplands
ﬁrst” (P9), to reduce soil erosion and the sediment load of the rivers.
But soon after that, in 1961, the SWCC of SC changed it: “themain target
area is the sloping cropland and the control of sloping cropland should
be combined with the control of uncultivated slopes, wind erosion
area and gullies through re-vegetation practices, such as grass-planting,
reforestation and closure” (P8). The main SWC practices became vegeta-
tive practices. From 1970 to 1977, MWR paidmore attention to land con-
struction to improve agricultural conditions.
4.1.4. Evaluation of effects of policy responses
In Stage 1, SWC played an important role for the recovery and devel-
opment of the local economy after the long social upheaval ofWorldWar
II and the Chinese InnerWars before the foundation of newChina in 1949.
Average yieldswere initiallyﬂuctuating around1 t ha−1 (1949–1969)but
almost doubled in the last 10 years of Stage 1 (Fig. 3). There were large
disparities however: crop yield on the sloping cropland was about
0.9 t ha−1, but amounted to 3.5 t ha−1 on the terraces and check-dam
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ly, it could not keep up with the requirements of society. Some actions,
such as tillage on steep slopes induced greater soil erosion, and showed
negative impacts. Over-ambitious planning of SWC was put forward as
a policy against the social background of “the Great Leap Forward Move-
ment” from 1958 to 1960. The government wanted to radically solve
problems of ﬂooding disasters and exploration of water for irrigation
and hydropower resources of the YellowRiver (P7). Themean suspended
sediment load at Huayuankou was 1.36 billion tons in 1956–1970 (15
years), illustrating some success in reducing sedimentation, and ﬂood di-
sasters were reduced (Table 2).
However, some policies were not implemented according to plan.
The main reason was that the SWC policy was too bold to implement,
e.g. a good policy based on “entire planning, integrated measures and
continuing implementation” in 1958 (P7) set a grand task to change
agricultural conditions and control the entire area affected by soil
erosion (158.9 thousand km2 before 1958 and the remaining 355.3
thousand km2 before 1964). Such integrated control would require no
soil erosion on the slopes and no runoff out of the gullies under the con-
ditions of (1) daily rainfall up to 100 mm in Inner Mongolia Autonomy
Region, Ningxia Autonomy Region, central area of Gansu Province and
Qinghai Province, (2) daily rainfall up to 150mminwest region of Shan-
xi Province, north region of Shaanxi Province, west region and south re-
gion of Gansu Province, and (3) daily rainfall up to 200 mm in Henan
Province. It was neither feasible nor necessary in terms of either physi-
cal process or economic capacity. It is a typical example of policy failure
because planning was too ambitious and far beyond of the ability of so-
ciety and citizens (Jansen et al., 2006).4.2. Policy responses in Stage 2
4.2.1. Main aims and tasks
With the development of SWC, the main aims and tasks evolved to
becomemore complex, starting with separate aims to reduce sediment
load and ﬂooding, improve production, and move towards integrated
watershed control and more holistic resource and environmental man-
agement. In Stage 2, themain aimwas to efﬁciently improve SWC based
on multidisciplinary appraisal which treated small watersheds as spe-
cial complex natural and economic units in this region (P10, P11).
MWR put forward a policy in which “integrated control should treat a
small watershed as a unit with overall planning and different efﬁcient
on-site practices” (Guo, 1995; Duan, 1999; CCoG, 1999; MWR SWCD,
1995). “Hills, water, forest, cropland and roads”were harnessed togeth-
er (P10) for holistic control (R1–R3) and long-term beneﬁts (P11, P14,
P16 and P18). A second characteristic response in Stage 2 was the iden-
tiﬁcation of key areas for SWC. The area of high erodibility is so large
that it was necessary to select some areas to prioritize according to
the soil erosion rate (R3) and impacts. Dedicated responses to pressures
(R2)were also considered: cultivation of reclaimed landwith slopes be-
tween 5° and 25° required permission from the local government (P13,
P14); logging without permission or digging for the roots of herbs was
forbidden to avoid new soil erosion (P6, P12, P14, P16, and P17).
Those engaging in these activities were ﬁned and even imprisoned if
the consequences were bad enough (P14, P15).4.2.2. Institutional aspects
The increasingly integrated approach to SWC in this stage could not
be implemented by local farmers themselves because the capacities of
investment, technology and labor of local farmers were insufﬁcient to
carry out the envisaged engineering works like check-dams and roads.
SC presented a structure of organizations involved in SWC and their
duties to enable implementing this policy and stated the principle to en-
courage communities to participate in SWC,whichwas until thenmain-
ly carried out by citizens, assisted by the State (P11).4.2.3. Strategic options
In Stage 2, the strategy emphasized the direction, suitability, integra-
tion and sustainability of SWC (P10). Engineering and vegetation prac-
tices were especially important, using grass and shrubs ﬁrst and then
trees. The slopes and gullies were to be controlled with different efﬁ-
cient practices; starting with overall planning, the control process
should start with severely eroded areas and only subsequently continue
with less eroded areas. Cropland on slopes steeper than 25° should be
gradually converted for forestry and animal husbandry, and the govern-
ment should provide cheaper food to the local people if the food pro-
duction there was not enough (P13). The focal area also shifted to
consider smaller coarse sediment source areas (78.6 thousand km2)
from where the sediment particles are big and difﬁcult to transfer to
the sea (YRCC EC, 2002). This helped the government to improve the
efﬁciency of sediment load control of the Yellow River.
SWC was mainly characterized as taking a small watershed as a
whole unit to plan and control with integrated control measures. As
the functions and suitability of SWC practices vary greatly depending
on soil erosion intensity, soil moisture and vegetation in different
sites, integrated control with different proper practices is necessary
both for SWC and agricultural development (Fig. 6). Integrated control
measures considering a small watershed as a whole have been put
forward since 1950s (Tang, 2004), but the systematic generalization, ex-
tension and implementation as action (P10) began in 1980 (Guo, 1995;
MWR SWCD, 1995; CCoG, 1999; Duan, 1999).
4.2.4. Evaluation of effects of policy responses
Since the implementation of the Act of Soil andWater Conservation
at the small watershed scale (P10), there were 5 phases which overall
involved surveying, planning and measurement of 164 small water-
sheds in YRB as experimental sites. During the process of implementa-
tion, many technical regulations, procedures for planning, investment,
research, checking and qualiﬁcationwere brought forward that promot-
ed the implementation of policy institutionally (Cao, 2007).
Besides, an investigation of the water conservancymanagement de-
partment and the integrated investigation team for SWC of the Loess
Plateau was organized by CAS in 1983. A project on integrated control
of the Loess Plateau was carried out by CAS from 1986 and began to
identify an overall strategy of soil erosion control and rural develop-
ment with real experimental and demonstration watersheds till 2000
(Li, 1996; Li and Sun, 1998; Wang et al., 2005a, 2005b).
The sediment load of the Yellow River decreased from an average of
1.29 billion tons to 764 million tons during this stage (Fig. 4) and the
cropland area and grain yield increased (Fig. 3).
4.3. Policy responses in Stage 3
4.3.1. Main aims and tasks
In Stage 3, the aim of the lawwas “the prevention and control of soil
erosion, the protection and rational utilization of water and soil re-
sources, the mitigation of ﬂood disasters, drought and sandstorms, the
improvement of the ecological environment and the development of
production (P14, Article 1)”. The law expressed the policy as “the state
shall, in relation to the work of water and soil conservation, implement
the policy of prevention ﬁrst, overall planning, comprehensive preven-
tion and control, adoption of measures suited to local conditions,
strengthening management and stress on beneﬁcial results (Article 4,
Chapter 1)” (P14) and changed the former policy of “paying the same
attention to prevention and control” (P6) to prioritizing prevention.
Under the P14, a series of laws and regulations were issued according to
this policy. Furthermore, the National Program for Eco-environmental
Protection and Regulations on Conversion of Farmland to Forest was pub-
lished by the State Council in 2000 and 2003 respectively (P17, P18).
These stated that SWC is not only an action for harnessing the Yellow
River and controlling soil erosion (i.e. R3 response) for agricultural
Fig. 6. Integrate control of MajiagouWatershed, Ansai County, China (Taken by FeiWang in 2010). Terraces mainly are on the moderate to gentle slopes, afforestation on the steep slopes
and small gullies, and check-dam for smallwatershed. The check-dam land is formatted after a long-term siltation and isﬂat and fertile enough for cultivation. The drainage system is set to
prevent the ﬂash ﬂoods induced by extreme storms).
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and safeguard the environment, economy and society (R1-3 response).
Policies were especially targeting reducing the driving force (R1 re-
sponse) of intensiﬁcation of food production and encouraging the de-
velopment of various renewable energies to relieve fuel shortages
(P14, and revised version in 2010). Pressures were also tackled speciﬁ-
cally (R2 responses); initially, local people who converted their crop-
land into grasslands and forests could get subsidies of grain for food
and cash for seedlings directly from the central government (P18).
Later, they could get cash through a new policy on conversion of
farmland to forest (P19). Most recently, a policy on ecological com-
pensation for SWC was put forward formally in 2010 and could pro-
mote SWC in many regions that currently experience a lower beneﬁt
return (P20).4.3.2. Institutional aspects
Since 1991, responsibility for SWC shifted to become the vital duty of
government and the responsibility of multiple stakeholders. The law
(P14) made it clear that “all organizations and individuals should have
the obligation to protect water and soil resources, prevent and control
soil erosion, and have the right to report against any unit or individual
that damages water and soil resources and causes soil erosion”(Article
3, Chapter 1), “The State Council and the local people's government at
various levels should regard the work of water and soil conservation
as an important duty, and adopt measures to ensure the prevention
and control of soil erosion” (Article 5, Chapter 1), and put the missions
of the planning of SWC into the development plan of public economy
and society (Article 7, Chapter 1). Legally, SWC should be carried out
by whoever was responsible for causing the loss of soil and water; the
conservation measures should rely on scientiﬁc technologies and per-
sonnel training to achieve progress; while the administrations of
water resource management and management organizations of SWC
supervision should be responsible for examining and approving the
SWCprograms (P14). State policies to help rural businesses and farmers
to conserve soil and water followed a principle that whoever took
charge managed the conservation and beneﬁted from it. For example,
construction companies and individuals were responsible for the losses
of soil and water they caused and for the SWC measures to counter the
losses (Guo, 1995; Duan, 1999).4.3.3. Strategic options
Prevention and containment of soil erosion have been given higher
priority than controlling the on-going erosion problems in the Law of
Soil andWater Conservation of China (P14). Ecological recovery and envi-
ronmental construction have become themain purpose of implementing
SWC (P17, P18). The “Grain for Green Project” (P18), in which the local
farmers could get food and cash subsidies from the government after
they converted sloping cropland into forests and grasslands, has been
widely implemented in this region (Cao et al., 2009). SWC has been con-
sidered not only as an action of “soil protection and sediment control of
the Yellow River”, but as the basic engineering approach towards the
“Eco-environmental Construction of China” for enhanced ecological func-
tions, natural resource management and the sustainable development of
China (P16, P17, P18, P19).
4.3.4. Evaluation of effects of policy responses
SWC progress and beneﬁts in the YRBwere great in the last 60 years
(Sun et al., 2009): the area of grain crops decreased, but food production
increased stably, satisfying the changing demands linked to population
growth (Fig. 2).
The sediment load of the Yellow River at Huayuankou Station de-
creased greatly with a very signiﬁcant linear trend (Fig. 5), and about
30% of the decrease in sediment load (350 to 450million tons annually)
has been attributed to SWCon the slopes (Meng, 1997; Tang, 2004). The
ecological, economic and social beneﬁts of conversion of farmland to
forest (well known as the “Grain for Green Project”) were very clear:
e.g. vegetation cover in the Loess Plateau increased quickly, and the
land area with a vegetation cover of more than 30% changed from b1%
of the total area of Wuqi County, Shaanxi Province in 2000 to 91.96%
in 2009 (Xin and Yu, 2009; Xu et al., 2011). In the whole Loess Plateau,
soil erosion reduced by 63.3% and the carbon sequestration increased by
35.3 Tg from 2000 to 2008 (Lü et al., 2012).
5. Discussion
5.1. Framework of DPSIR
Using the DPSIR framework we have reconstructed the story of SWC
policy change showing the detailed interaction between elements
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describing the driving forces, pressures, states, impacts and the policy
responses induced by impacts which in turn had feedback effects on
driving forces, pressures and states. The issues addressed by policy are
made obvious so that the DPSIR framework could not only make the
policy-making process more efﬁcient and pertinent, but also help to
identify practices and approaches to cope with soil erosion, heavy sedi-
ment load of river, ﬂood risk and local poverty and their effects in differ-
ent time periods.
Normally policy development needs broad participation of different
stakeholders from local farmers, researchers to governmental policy
makers, but there is no clear place in which these aspects can obviously
be analyzed using the DPSIR framework. Hence better policies may be
devised if we combine DPSIR and other methods, like stakeholder anal-
ysis, which allows identiﬁcation of the key actors in the implementation
of each policy stage (Atkins et al., 2011).
5.2. On policy
There are many factors affecting the adoption of SWC policy (Ervin
and Ervin, 1982; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007), but it seems to work
well in China because there are no great conﬂicts between local farmers
and downstream regions. Other human behaviors play a role in SWC
and natural resource management though. For instance, economic ac-
tivities are often driven by motivation for survival or other beneﬁts
(Wossink and Swinton, 2007; Vignola et al., 2010), and can be changed
by policy; religion, culture and awareness also play a role (indirectly) in
both economic activities and policy making (Fig. 6) (Wang et al., 2002;
Throsby, 2008; Bhagwat et al., 2011). The motivation of survival and
money drives local people to cultivate or dig out medical herbs with lit-
tle consideration of policy, law or social responsibility. Poorly conceived
policy also could destroy the land. For instance, the government encour-
aged people to cultivate in the early Qing Dynasty (220 B.C.) and the
policy introduced a tax-free period for new cropland in the ﬁrst several
years. The effects of this were that cropland expanded rapidly, lead-
ing to frequent ﬂash ﬂoods (Wang et al., 2001). Generally, the policy
evolved with pressure and state in this region based on the relation-
ship between different stakeholders and among the environmental
problems.
The SWC policy in YRB has a long-term purpose and targets a partic-
ular problem, but somepolicieswere too bold and/or urgent and did not
pay careful consideration to biophysical and economic feasibility, e.g.
proposing to build many reservoirs for siltation (P1, P2, P3 and P5),Fig. 7. Levels of hum
Revised based onWand over-optimistically planning for total soil erosion control (P7) in a
way that neglected the complexity of the ecological system and power
of natural processes (Mu and Li, 1999). With enhanced understanding
about the intricacies of environmental and socio-economic processes
in the whole of the YRB, SWC became the most important solution to
address both rural development and ﬂood disasters, and therefore,
SWC policy improved rationally.
SWCpolicy nevertheless paid very little attention to thewater short-
age issue of the whole basin. The annual water resource availability is
about 520 m3 per person (near the lower threshold of water scarcity
of 500–1000 m3 per capita per annum) (Falkenmark et al., 1989), but
the runoff at Sanmenxia Hydrological Station decreased by 30%–50%
or more since 1990, and the lower reach became dry in every year
during the period 1991–1999 (Mu et al., 2004). The runoff at
Huayuankou Hydrological Station showed the same trends (Fig. 7).
Impacts of water shortages on the development of the lower reaches
have already appeared. Our analysis suggests that in light of this
gap, present policy should pay more attention to water shortages
when reducing the sediment load, as there are no policies focusing
on RRS (Ratio of Runoff detained to Sediment detained) (Wang
et al., 2005a, 2005b; Mo et al., 2007).
6. Conclusion
Soil erosion, the sediment load and ﬂooding are issues of great con-
cern in the YRB. SWC has been demonstrated to play an important role
over the long-term when considering the on-site and off-site effects of
these issues. The implementation of SWC policy has remarkably changed
the condition of the environment, economy and society in the YRB, miti-
gating local poverty in eroded areas, improving food production and re-
ducing ﬂood risk in the lower reaches.
DPSIR has been used to analyze the development of SWC in the
study area in a historical perspective to describe the conceptualization
and operation of SWC policy since 1949 as a response to the impacts
of soil erosion and ﬂooding. The SWC policy could act on the driving
forces, pressures and states directly because it was developed based
on the environmental and social problems and necessities of the
whole basin. It was carried out with institutional, ﬁnancial and techno-
logical support from the government and themotivation of local people.
Even though approaches to SWC changed continuously, based on an
overview of the problem, important documents and actual SWC mea-
sures, 3 clear stages were distinguished which coincided with changes
in main aims and tasks, institutional set-up and strategies.an activities.
ang et al. (2002).
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to a beneﬁcial river in Stage 1 (1950–1979)were so charming in the be-
ginning of a newpoor country suffering fromwars that they encouraged
people to set policies for rural development (especially for food and
fuel) in eroded areas and to reduce the sediment load of the river with
reservoirs for siltation and SWC. The local farmers were required to ful-
ﬁll SWC at that time as their own responsibility to improve living condi-
tions. The results of SWC on rural development and on sediment control
on the slopes and in the river were very great.
The overall development of rural industry and soil erosion control
with integrated SWC practices was the main aim of Stage 2 (1980–
1990). The public powers, like companies, united SWC groups and
SWC teams of local governments, were encouraged to engage in SWC
with local farmers. The people could get help from the government be-
causewell-controlledwatersheds needed good practices and the efforts
and investment they could undertake in some strongly eroded water-
sheds were not enough. The SWC in this stage resulted in many water-
sheds with no sediment ﬂowing away and the integrated control
continues working today.
With the economic improvement of China, the government started
paying evenmore attention to SWC and treated it as a primarymeasure
for natural resource conservation, environment protection, disastermit-
igation and agriculture development in Stage 3 (1991–present). The
government assumed responsibility for SWC with administrative, legal
and ﬁnancial approaches and various technologies that made large-
scale SWC engineering possible. Agricultural conditions in the eroded
area improved greatly and the ecological system restored signiﬁcantly
during this stage. The runoff and sediment load of the Yellow River de-
creased dramatically.
Even though SWChad a great contribution to rural development and
sediment reduction over the last 60 years, some challenges remain. For
example, the Yellow River is still one of the muddiest rivers, with
the riverbed continuing to rise above the land outside of the river for
many meters (Zhao, 1996; Wu et al., 2005). Water shortages in the
lower reaches are still worsening which is of particular concern given
the increasing inﬂuence of climate change in this region (Wang et al.,
2007). Consequently, is necessary to further improve SWCpolicy to con-
tinue to develop better environmental and economic functions.
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